In this paper, we investigate the security of micropayment protocols that support low-value transactions. We focus on one type of such protocols that are based on hash chains. We present a formal specification of a typical hash chain based micropaymentprotocol using Abstract Protocol notation, and discuss how an adversary can attack this protocol using message loss, modification, and replay. We use convergence theory to show that this protocol is secure against these attacks. The specification and verification techniques used in this paper can be applied to other micropayment protocols as well. : (type of input) var (name of constant) : (type of constant) (name of constant) : (type of constant) par (name of constant) : (type of constant)
Introduction
As online businesses grow, there is an increasing demand for micropayment protocols that facilitate microcommerce, namely selling content and services for small amounts of money (possibly less than one cent per transaction), which cannot be handled efficiently by credit cards due to substantial per transaction fee and delay. Examples of such content and services are web pages and online games. Many micropayment p r o tocols have been proposed for microcommerce, such as [1,3,6,7,10-121. These protocols need to he regarded as "secure" before they can win the approval of customers and vendors alike. However, none of these protocols have been formally specified and verified.
In this paper, we address this issue by formally specifying a micropayment protocol, which is based on Lamport's idea of hash chains [9] , using the Abstract Protocol notation presented in [4] , and formally verifying the security of this protocol using the convergence theory in [5] . We choose such a hash chain based micropay-1 Alex X. Liu is the corresponding author of this paper. 0-7803-8784-8/$20.00 (C) 2004 lEEE 489 ment protocol because it is a typical micropayment prrr tocol and the techniques that we use in specifying and verifying this protocol can be applied to other micrcpayment protocols as well. There arc many hash chain based micropayment protocols, such as Anderson [lo] , Rivest and Shamir's PayWord [ll] , and W3C's MPTP [12] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a brief introduction to Abstract Protocol notation, while in Section 3, we formally specify the hash chain based micropayment protocol using this notation. In Section 4, we give an introduction to the convergence theory. In Section 5 , we verify the security of the protocol. We give conclusions in Section 6.
Abstract Protocol Notation
In this section, we give a brief introduction to the Abstract Protocol notation [4] . In this notation, each process in a protocol is defined by sets of constants, variables, parameters, and actions. For instance, in a protocol consisting of two processes p and q and two oppositedirection channels, one from p to q and one from q to p, process p can be defined as follows: ...
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Formal Specification
There are many hash chain based micropayment protocols such as Rivest . The basic ideas of these protocols are quite similar. Here we take PayWord as an example to explain this type of protocols.
There are three types of parties in PayWord protocol: users, vendors, and banks. Each user bas a private key, a public key, and a certificate. The certificate contains the bank's name, the user's name, the user's public key and the expiration date. Each vendor knows each bank's public key and therefore can verify each user's certificate. All parties, including users, vendors, and banks, know a one-way hash function h.
Each day, when a user U needs to pay a vendor v for the first time, U at first conjectures the most likely maximum number of "coins" that she might need to pay the vendor that day, which is denoted n. Second, U picks a random number, which is denoted The above PayWord protocol has two security holes. First, it is vulnerable to message loss attack. An attacker can discard a payment message from U and U . When this happens, U should retransmit the lost payment. However, due to the lack of an acknowledgement mechanism in the PayWord protocol, U does not know whether a payment was actually received by v or not.
begin
(action) 0 (action) Li ...
(action) end
The constants of process p have fixed values. Inputs of process p can be read, but not updated, by the actions of process p. Variables of process p can be both read and updated by the actions of process p. Comments can be added anywhere in process p; every comment is placed between the two brackets { and }.
Each (action) of process p is of the form:
The guard of an action of process p is of one of the following three forms: (1) a boolean expression over the constants andvariables of p , (2) a receive guard of the form 'Zcv (message) from g", (3) a timeout guard that contains a boolean expression over the constants and variables of every process and the contents of all channels in the protocol. A parameter declared in a process is used to write a finite set of actions as one action, with one action for each possible value of the parameter.
Executing an action consists of executing the statement of the action. Executing the actions of different processes in a protocol proceeds according to the following three rules. First, an action is executed only when its guard is true. Second, the actions in a protocol are executed one at a time. Third, an action whose guard is continuously true is eventually executed.
The (statement) of an action of process p is a sequence of (skip), (send), (assiynment), (selection), or (iteration) statements of the following forms:
(iteration)
There are two channels between the two processes: one is from p to q, and the other is from q to p. Each message sent from p to q remains in the channel from p to q until'it is eventually received by process q. Messages that reside simultaneously in a channel form a s e quence and are received, one at a time, in the same order in which they were sent. Second, the PayWord protocol is vulnerable to message modification attack. An attacker can modify a valid variable-size payment message (c[i], m) (m 2 2) to a different yet valid payment (h(c[i]),m -1). When this happens, w should discard the modified payment. However, in PayWord protocol, such a modified payment is deemed as a valid one by w. Similar to the PayWord protocol, W3C's MPTP, Micro-iKP and NetCard also suffer from the above two vulnerabilities (Note that in Micro-iKP and NetCard, the effect of a message modification attack is the same as a message loss attack because these two micropayment protocols do not support variable-size payments.)
The above two security holes of the PayWord protocol were previously discovered in 181. However, the solutions proposed in [8] are inefficient. In [8] , to counter message loss attacks, a vendor is also required to compute and store a different hash chain c' of length n and each element d[i] is used to acknowledge the coin c[i] received from a user U . This solution is inefficient because it is possible that U only spends a few coins with w although a computes a hash chain of length n. Therefore, U wastes both time and space in computing and storing a hash chain of length n because she only needs to send a few acknowledgements. The solution to counter message modification attacks in [8] fails to enable a vendor to detect whether a variable-size payment has been modified or not when she receives it.
Our solution to these two security holes are much more efficient than the solutions proposed in [SI. First, we use a securely salted one-way hash function h(ss, .), where ss is not known to attackers, instead of a nor- Next, we present a hash chain based micropayment protocol that uses our above solutions to fix these two security holes. For simplicity and elaboration of the above two security fixes, we only present the protocol between a user U and a vendor w. We also assume there is a shared key sk between U and w, which can be achieved by public key cryptography. Each hash chain created by U has a sequence number that starts at 0. There are two phases in this hash chain based micropayment protocol: request-reply phase and pay-aek phase.
In request-reply phase, U first picks two random numbers for c[n] and ss, then computes a hash from U , she decrypts it using the shared key sk and checks whether "seq" is the one that she expects. If so, w sends reply message rply(c[O]) to U ; otherwise w discards the request message. When U receives this reply message, U knows that w received the request message correctly and U starts sending payments.
In the pay-ack phase, U sends a payment message pay(c[t], m) to U . The value of this payment pay(c[t], m) is m coins. When w receives this payment message, she applies the hash function h to c[t] for m times and then checks whether the result is the coin that U received previously from U . If so, then w sends acknowledgement message ack(h(ss, c)) back to U ; otherwise U discards the payment message. When U receives the acknowledgement message, she knows that w received the payment message correctly and she continues to send other payments.
The time chart that shows the message Row of this hash chain based micropayment protocol is shown in Figure 1 . The two processes U and w are specified in Figure 2 using the Abstract Protocol notation. Note that "any" represents an arbitrary number chosen by a human being, and "random" represents a random number generated by a computer. Here, #ch.u.u denotes the number of messages in the channel from U to v. We use N C R and DCR to denote encryption and decryption functions respectively. 
Convergence Theory
In this section, we outline a verification method, which is based on the three concepts from convergence theory [2,5], namely closure, convergence, and protection, for verifying the security of protocols that are specified using the Abstract Protocol notation. Later in Section 5, we use this method to verify the security of the Millicent micropayment protocol. This verification method is based on the following definitions.
A state of a protocol is an assignment of a value to each variable of each process in the protocol and an assignment of a sequence of messages to each channel in the protocol. The value assigned to each variable is from the domain of that variable. If the guard of an action of a process in a protocol has the value true at some state of the protocol, then the action is said to be enabled at that state. For simplicity, we assume that at each state of a system, at least one action of that system is enabled.
A transition of a protocol is a pair ( p , q) of states of the protocol such that some process in the protocol has an action whose guard is true at state p and execution of that action when the protocol is at state p yields the state q.
A computation of a protocol is an infinite sequence A protocol is called secure if it satisfies the following three conditions: 1. Closure: In each protocol computation whose first state is safe, every state is safe.
. Formal Verification
In this section, we formally verify that the hash chain based micropayment protocol specified in Section 3 is secure against message loss, modification and replay attacks.
First, we examine the state transition diagram of this protocol without adversary actions, which is shown in Figure 3 . The six safe states, S.l through S.6, are defined in Figure 4 . Here seq, denotes the variable seq in process U , similarly for seq,, ssU, etc. Note that the action u.i denotes the i-th action in process u and the action v i denotes the i-th action in process U .
s.2
phase and payack phase of the protocol respectively with adversary actions. The adversary actions are labelled L (for message loss), M (for message modification), and R (for message replay). The additional states that result from the adversary actions, labelled L.1 through L.6, M.1 through M.4, and R.l through R.6, are all unsafe states. Note that action T denotes the timeout action in process U. {ock(h(c[t] , ss"))} Second, we examine the state transition diagram of this protocol with adversary actions. Figure 5 and 6 show the state transition diagrams of the request-reply 
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Reply Phase with Adversary Actions
As an example, we examine the four unsafe states (namely L.l, M.l, R.l, and R.2) that result from adversary actions when the protocol is in state S.2. In state 5.2, there is one request message in the channel from u to U . If an adversary launches a message loss attack, i.e., discards the request message from U to U , then the protocol moves to an unsafe state L.l. In state L.l, only the timeout action T of process u is enabled and eventually executed, and henceforth brings the protocol back to the safe state 5. Figure 6 shows the state transition diagram of the pay-ack phase of the protocol with adversary actions.
From Figure 5 and 6, we conclude that the protocol does satisfy the convergence condition because any computation whose first state is an unsafe state has a safe state. Next we prove that the protocol satisfies the protection condition by showing that no critical variables are updated when the protocol is in an unsafe state. The protocol has nine critical variables, namely e, n, t , seq, ss and s t of process U, and lastc, seq and ss of p r e cess U. By examining the unsafe states in Figure 5 and 6, we see that any of the above nine critical variables is updated only in safe states. For example, the variable lastc in process v is updated only when v receives a valid request message or a valid payment message.
In conclusion, the hash chain based micropayment protocol is secure against message loss, modification and replay attacks.
Conclusions
Our contributions in this paper are three-fold. First, we present two security fixes to the precious hash chain based micropayment protocols. Second, we formally specify a hash-chain based micropayment protocol using Abstract Protocol notation. Third, we formally verify that this protocol is secure against message loss, modification, and replay attacks using convergence theory. The specification and verification techniques used in this paper can be applied t o other micropayment protocols as well.
